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Abstract
Nicholas Agar, Jeff McMahan and Allen Buchanan have all expressed concerns 
about enhancing humans far outside the species-typical range. They argue radically 
enhanced beings will be entitled to greater and more beneficial treatment through an 
enhanced moral status, or a stronger claim to basic rights. I challenge these claims 
by first arguing that emerging technologies will likely give the enhanced direct con-
trol over their mental states. The lack of control we currently exhibit over our men-
tal lives greatly contributes to our sense of vulnerability. I then argue moral sta-
tus should be viewed in terms of vulnerability. The enhanced will slowly gain the 
ability to command their mental states, reducing their vulnerability. These radically 
enhanced beings will have greater capacities, and possibly an inner life more valu-
able than our own. They will also be less vulnerable, and as a result, their moral 
status will be subordinate to our own.
Keywords Mental states · Moral status · Radical enhancement · Rights · 
Vulnerability
1  Radical enhancement as a moral status de‑enhancer
Radical enhancement—those enhancements that bring our capacities and abili-
ties reatly outside species-typical functioning—have worried many. Nicholas Agar 
has argued that radically enhanced beings will have a moral status that exceeds our 
own (2014). Jeff McMahan has voiced a similar concern, focusing on our violabil-
ity (2009), while Allen Buchanan worries the radically enhanced will have stronger 
interests than mere persons (2009). I will argue these concerns are misguided, as 
these novel beings will have a moral status subordinate to our own.
This paper is broken into six sections. The first section will be spent getting clear 
on the views of Agar, McMahan and Buchanan. In Section Two I will motivate a 
plausible conception of the radically enhanced. Section Three will be spent testing 
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the conceptions of moral status offered by Agar, McMahan and Buchanan against 
my own conception—moral status as vulnerability. Section Four will be spent argu-
ing for a narrow conception of vulnerability and its theoretical relation to moral 
status. In section Five I argue that cognitive enhancements are a morally desirable 
thing. The final section is reserved for objections.
1.1  Enhancement and moral status
Our abilities can be enhanced along many dimensions. Enhancing our physical abili-
ties may include strength, stamina and vision, all of which are important for athletics 
and in daily life. We can mitigate muscle tremors, enhancing our ability to create 
art and perform surgery. Or we can enhance our emotional and cognitive capacities, 
those things that constitute our inner life. These cognitive and emotional enhance-
ments may take the form of intelligence and memory, or those elements that make 
our inner life worth having, love, joy and empathy to name a few. It may be pos-
sible to enhance moral behavior, these moral disposition enhancements can make 
more moral behavior more likely (Douglas 2008). We may even enhance moral sta-
tus directly. Moral status enhancement may arise from the development of a new 
capacity, or perhaps augmenting capacities such as rationality and empathy may be 
sufficient to raise moral status. A variety of methods can be employed to make these 
enhancements a reality. Biochemical interventions, such as performance enhancing 
drugs are one option. Genetic interventions are becoming much more likely with the 
targeted approach of CRISPR-Cas9. Environmental enhancements we are all famil-
iar with, these include legal and educational institutions, as well as societal norms. 
While the radically enhanced will most likely be enhanced along every dimension 
mentioned and utilize several methods, the most pertinent to this discussion are 
those enhancements that constitute our inner life. In Section Two I will focus most 
closely on cognitive and moral (disposition and status) enhancement. But first, I 
want to get clear on several views of moral status
Nicholas Agar takes no issue with the enhancements mentioned above, as long as 
they are moderate enhancements—those enhancements that strengthen our capaci-
ties and abilities within species-typical functioning. Agar is concerned that enhanc-
ing outside the species-typical range will create post-persons—beings with greater 
moral status than mere-persons (Agar 2014, p. 157). If this is right, then it seems we 
mere persons may lose many of the rights and privileges we have grown accustom 
to. The radically enhanced may edge us out of cooperating in civil society, they may 
act paternalistically toward us undermining our autonomy, or they may even use us 
as model organisms in research, in much the same way we abuse a variety of non-
human animals
Agar focuses on direct moral status enhancements. Enhancing non-human ani-
mals with capacities sufficient for personhood would be one way to directly enhance 
moral status. For Agar a moral status enhancer “increases a being’s entitlement to 
certain forms of beneficial treatment and reduces it’s eligibility for certain types of 
harmful treatment” (Agar 2014, pp. 158–159). So moral status is:
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MS  A being’s entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment, and reduced 
eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment
This is an intuitive notion of moral status, but it remains unclear why we should 
think post-persons could experience the sort of moral status boost non-human ani-
mals have the potential to experience through radical enhancement
Two key elements of Agar’s argument are: (1) a distinction between weak and 
strong thresholds, and (2) an induction from everyday observation. Strong thresh-
olds for moral status are insensitive to the modification or addition of capacities. 
There will be no difference between persons and post-persons no matter the degree 
or type of enhancement. Weak thresholds are far more sensitive. Post-persons, given 
significant enough changes will have some feature(s) that will make a positive dif-
ference to moral status (Agar 2014, p. 162). Agar favors weak thresholds, but only 
speaks minimally in support of them. To aid his account I will turn to the work of 
Stan Husi. Husi argues against strong thresholds (and moral equality amongst mere 
persons 1). One issue lies in our ability to transform scalar properties into binary 
ones. For example, rationality is clearly a scalar property that admits of degrees. 
We can be more and less rational within the species-typical range, and there are 
a multitude of ways to increase or decrease rationality outside the species-typical 
range. Figuring out what category, or threshold one is in, just becomes a matter of 
math. We impose an asymmetry on the math that Husi finds implausible. Take any 
property relevant to moral status X, (X−n) makes a huge difference to moral sta-
tus, removing one from a higher threshold. But adding to the relevant property X, 
(X + n) makes no difference. Compelling reasons are needed to justify this asymme-
try, and Husi finds the asymmetry too implausible to be taken seriously (Husi 2017, 
pp. 391–92). Weak thresholds offer a plausible alternative to the more commonplace 
strong threshold view
Agar’s second move is to note the well-established gradient of moral concern that 
already exists. Rocks are sacrificed before non-human animals, and non-human ani-
mals sacrificed before persons. Continuing the pattern would suggest that mere per-
sons are sacrificed before post-persons. One thing to note is that it would be a very 
convenient fact that persons occupy the highest moral status category or tier. Agar’s 
point is much stronger, he argues that if moral statuses higher than personhood exist, 
and we are confronted with these beings directly, we will be unable to understand 
and recognize why they have greater status (Agar 2014, pp. 174, 78–80). The reason 
we don’t continue the inductive move is a limitation of our creative and intellec-
tual powers, rather than a feature of the world. These two points don’t establish that 
higher statuses than personhood exist, but they provide enough justification to take 
the idea seriously
1 Husi’s issue is with the conceptual framework of egalitarian principles, primarily threshold accounts. 
He is very clear that prejudices of the past and present are deplorable. Even though he finds threshold 
accounts unjustifiable, this in no way undermines our obligations to treat others with full respect.
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A second view on moral status comes from Jeff McMahan, who also finds it plau-
sible that higher statuses than personhood may exist. For McMahan, supra-persons2 
may enter this uncharted territory. Supra-persons are beings whose psychological 
capacities exceed our capacities, by more than our psychological capacities exceed 
those of non-human animals (McMahan 2009, p. 600). As increasing our psycho-
logical capacities alone might not be enough to alter moral status, McMahan offers 
the possibility that a new emergent property may grant access to a higher moral sta-
tus threshold. The difference between mere and post-persons is the degree to which 
each is inviolable. In normal circumstances no human being can be sacrificed for the 
benefit of another human being. But when the numbers are large enough, it becomes 
permissible to sacrifice one innocent person to save the lives of the many. Invio-
lability isn’t equal across all beings as non-human animals have a lower degree of 
inviolability, as they are readily sacrificed for food, clothing and research (McMa-
han 2009, pp. 599–601). This second conception of moral status is: moral status as 
inviolability or (MSI). MSI states:
MSI  The degree to which one human being can be sacrificed for the benefit of 
another human being
 If this is right, then a single supra-person can only be sacrificed in the event that 
their life will save the lives of numerous mere persons. Conversely several mere per-
sons could be sacrificed for the benefit of a single supra-person. I challenge this in 
section III and argue that supra-persons could be sacrificed before mere persons.
In contrast to Agar and McMahan, Allen Buchanan is highly skeptical of higher 
moral statuses. One reason is no positive account of the radically enhanced has been 
given. Without an idea of what enhancements will provide for greater moral status, 
the concern of beings with greater moral status can be put on hold (Buchanan2009, 
p. 354). A deeper reason is what Buchanan calls the Moral Equality Assump-
tion (MEA). MEA holds that all beings who possess sufficient attributes for per-
sonhood have the same moral status (p. 347). Buchanan favors a strong threshold 
account, grounded in Kantian respect and the capacity for mutual accountability. 
For Buchanan, strong thresholds and the MEA better match our intuitions about 
why beings with certain capacities deserve equal respect, and why increasing those 
capacities doesn’t alter this base level of respect. This is contrasted with an interest-
based view, which he attributes to Utilitarians. Buchanan views interest-based views 
as discarding moral status thresholds all together and puts interests along a single 
continuum. The problem with this view is that it is easy to classify different interests 
along a spectrum, but it is hard to draw a sharp line between interests. For example, 
it becomes difficult to draw a sharp line between humans and non-human animals 
(Buchanan 2009, pp. 360–361). As we intuitively draw this line, we should prefer 
strong thresholds, over interest-based accounts. Further, if we treat all properties as 
if they were scalar properties, we might note the great variation in capacities and 
2 Post-Persons, supra-persons and the radically enhanced are synonymous. I will use them interchange-
ably for stylistic reasons. I hope the reader won’t find this terribly confusing.
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talents that already exist. It may be tempting to lower or raise the status of some 
humans and given our history that may be too much to accept
Buchanan’s chief concern is not about greater moral status (since there is unlikely 
to be higher ones), it is about what happens if competing interests emerge, ones that 
confer different rights on the enhanced and unenhanced. Post-persons may become 
enhanced cooperators, engaging in civic life in ways mere persons are unsuited for. 
Post-persons may act paternalistically toward us in the same way we act paternalisti-
cally towards the severely disabled (with the intent of protecting them), or they may 
exclude mere persons as they lack the capacity to cooperate in a meaningful way 
(Buchanan 2009, pp. 373–375). Buchanan uses the analogy of a card game. It is 
permissible to minimize participation between Go Fish players (mere persons) and 
Bridge players (post-persons) since Go Fish players can’t cooperate, interact with, or 
make a meaningful contribution to the game of Bridge. The interests of the Bridge 
players supersede that of Go Fish players. These conflicting interests may be so 
great that the radically enhanced enjoy a richer set of rights, guaranteeing that their 
interests take priority, while the unenhanced enjoy a simpler basic set of rights. As 
their moral status is the same, a third concern is that of conflicting interests or (CI)
(CI)  All agents share an equal moral status, but not equal interests. The enhanced 
will have a stronger claim (or right) to have their interests fulfilled
Three views of moral status have just been offered. Two items still need address-
ing. First, we need a conception of what a radically enhanced being will be like. In 
the next section I will add to McMahan’s account of supra-persons. Second, we need 
to know the practical impact of the theoretical principles put forward earlier. In sec-
tion Three I argue that the implications of MS, MSI and CI previously discussed are 
untenable and should be abandoned
2  Radical enhancement
As mentioned previously, the radically enhanced will likely experience a wide array 
of enhancements utilizing an array of technologies. While super-intelligence and 
athletic prowess are likely features of post-persons, what is often overlooked is some 
ability to modulate their inner life. Mere persons do this routinely, albeit in an indi-
rect fashion. Music, mediation or a serene walk are readily available tools to attenu-
ate stress and anxiety. To engage our empathy we may focus on people who look 
like us or focus on events that contain small numbers of people, as it is impossible to 
empathize with millions at once (Bloom 2018, pp. 31–34). To deal with the stressors 
of war soldiers often resort to telling “cold jokes,” jokes that dehumanize enemy 
combatants making it easier to kill and torture them (Glover 1999, pp. 36–37), 
matching our psychology, which may be geared towards imbuing essential proper-
ties on others (Smith 2012, pp. 32–34, 100–101). Most of our day is spent trying 
to control our mental states, for better or worse. More than two thousand years ago 
Sextus argued for skepticism as a form of medicine that would allow one to suspend 
judgment and enter ataraxia (Empiricus 1996). Buddhists focused on meditation as 
 J. Gray 
1 3
the mechanism to ameliorate suffering (De-Bary and Bloom 2000, pp. 435–440). In 
what follows I will discuss current technology that will give us greater access and 
control over our inner lives. I then speculate that increasing technology could give 
us the means to directly control our mental states. Direct mental state control will 
make the indirect tools of mere persons obsolete.
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) involves implanting electrodes in the brain to treat 
psychiatric and movement disorders. This technique is an improvement on earlier 
tissue removal surgeries of as it allows for greater control (the ability to manipulate 
the stimulus) and is reversible as the implants can be removed. Currently only those 
patients who are resistant to traditional therapies are considered for DBS devices. 
DBS has shown success as a treatment for depression, anxiety, OCD, Tourette’s syn-
drome, Parkinson’s, anorexia, addiction, PTSD and aggressive behavior. One long-
term heroin patient even reported feeling decreases and increases of heroin cravings 
in response to different stimulation settings (Cleary et  al. 2015). This technology 
can modulate our inner life and may one day be used outside of therapeutic contexts 
to enhance moods and curb unwanted behaviors such as addiction and aggression. 
DBS is still in its infancy, and not without substantial risks, but can give insights 
into how the radically enhanced may one day function.
Optogenetics is similar to DBS in its invasive nature but differs mechanistically 
as it uses light to stimulate neurons as opposed to electricity. Opsins are light sensi-
tive membrane proteins. These proteins react to light in specific wavelengths and 
constitute the first step in our visual pathway. With the aid of genetic technologies, 
opsins can be expressed in the brain, and in the presence of light can stimulate neu-
rons rapidly in real time. This can allow for a more targeted approach than DBS as 
the optic fibers inserted in the brain can emit different wave lengths of light and only 
stimulate specific target cells (Aravanis et al. 2007). This technology can adjust the 
focus from broad adjustments (adjusting neurotransmitter level) to the fine-grained 
approach of targeting a circuit (Deisseroth 2011). Optogenetics has been shown to 
modify both feeding and predatory behavior in mice.3
Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) began development in the late 1970′s. Non-inva-
sive methods such as EEG have been used to move mouse cursors (Wolpaw and 
Mcfarland 2004; McFarland et al. 1997), while the more invasive sensor implanta-
tion has been shown effective in cursor control and manipulation of prosthetic hands 
and robotic arms4 (Hochberg et al. 2006). The tasks being performed are still rudi-
mentary, and able-bodied persons would find the technology cumbersome. But it is 
readily conceivable that one day we will use this sort of technology to operate our 
phones and computers, and it is not a far leap from there to imagine it can be used to 
help modulate our inner lives.
3 A video of mice feeding behavior can be found at: https ://neuro compl iment er.blogs pot.com/2013/09/ 
While a video of predatory behavior can be found at: https ://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=FlGbz nBmx8 
M.
4 Videos of cursor manipulation (opening emails, drawing circles), gameplay (pong), and manipulating 
prosthetics are available in the supplementary information section of this paper available on Nature’s 
website.
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If post-persons are to command their inner lives, DBS seems to be a poor option. 
Its mode of delivery is too imprecise to give the sort of control I envision. However, 
the research gleamed from this technology will be invaluable in our understanding 
of the effects of direct neural intervention.5 Optogenetics is a more powerful tool, 
but is a long way off in humans, for practical and ethical reasons. Suppose we sur-
pass these hurdles, why limit the use of a system like this to treat depression, OCD, 
or addictive behaviors?6 Why not incorporate fiber optics throughout the entire 
brain? Doing so would give the ability to enjoy the mental benefits of a long walk, 
from the comfort of your couch. The brain states would be identical in each case. 
Modulating our inner lives would be a daunting task for most users, but most of 
the work will be done by a central computer, that will learn a specific brain and set 
presets for certain behaviors. The user then will be able to increase or decrease the 
stimulation based on need. These states will map the ones we routinely experience. 
Special education teachers may bookmark a calm or patient setting, enhancing their 
ability to engage with and instruct their students. Athletes may opt to feel stimulated 
or enlivened when training and competing, enhancing their ability to stick to their 
daily regiments. Our most intimate mental states, our feelings of passion, lust and 
love can be modulated. This technology could be used to better match our partners 
emotional state or to aid in leaving a destructive relationship.7
This technology could be integrated seamlessly into our lives. Optogenetic fibers 
could be controlled by a small computer interface connected to a smartwatch. BCI 
could allow the user to manipulate this device with their mind, and in a matter of 
seconds select the preset for the mood they want to be in. The user would then be 
free to make minor adjustments, increasing or decreasing the stimulus for greater 
comfort. For those who may find this unsettling, is it really that much different from 
consuming alcohol after a stressful day at work? Or is it far different than drinking a 
glass of wine on a first date? My intuition is that it is not.8, 9
One last enhancement focuses on pain diminution. Since optogenetics can play 
an inhibitory role, it seems plausible that it could be used to inhibit pain. This would 
be one way to tailor and dilute our response to painful stimuli. A simpler approach 
would be to alter the pain nerves themselves. Voltage gated sodium channels  (Nav) 
play a role in pain signaling and are the target of research for new and less addic-
tive analgesics (Offord 2017).  Nav 1.7 has garnered particular interest, as mutations 
have been identified that both greatly increase and reduce pain, while a complete 
5 Future research on DBS greatly outweighs that of optogenetics as measured by upcoming clinical tri-
als. These can be viewed at https ://www.clini caltr ials.gov
6 Those that endorse the treatment-enhancement distinction will offer reasons not to enhance. I set this 
issue aside, as it is outside the scope of this paper.
7 Some have argued that modulating our love lives is a morally desirable thing. For an extensive argu-
ment on this with practical tools in mind see Love Drugs (Earp and Savulescu 2020).
8 As the ethics of enhancing are outside the scope of my argument, I will leave this point hanging. For 
those interested in exploring this point further see Neuroethics (2007) by Neil Levy. He argues for parity 
between traditional and technological methods of intervention.
9 Andy Clark has argued that we are natural born cyborgs (extended mind hypothesis), and that we are 
built to integrate technology into us. For numerous examples of how we naturally incorporate technology 
into our daily lives see Natural Born Cyborgs (Clark 2003).
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 Nav 1.7 knockout is non-lethal in humans (Dib-Hajj et al. 2010). It seems unlikely 
that evolution selected for an optimal level of pain tolerance and our experience of 
it, but rather, only selected for the right amount to aid in survival and reproduction. 
Given that we live in a far different environment than our ancestors, it may be appro-
priate to alter our nociceptors themselves. The goal would not be the elimination 
of pain, but to dampen it. For example, reducing  Nav 1.7 expression might slightly 
raise our pain threshold, so that more of a painful stimulus is needed to evoke the 
pain response.
At this point, the difference between current technology and my account of the 
radically enhanced is magical. In a discussion on AI, Nick Bostrom has given sev-
eral reasons to be weary of the prospects for technologies like DBS and BCI, and 
the timeframe they will be implemented. Several complications may occur which 
include infection from surgery and stimulating neural tissue outside the target zone. 
Additionally we have only seen limited success in therapeutic settings, and none in 
enhancement. It is far easier to bring someone back to baseline, than to improve 
their capacities. Our brains are finite machines with limited computing power. Add-
ing chips to the brain may do little to aid our thinking, if the brain can only process 
information so fast (Bostrom 2014, pp. 63–67). Finally, much of the benefits these 
technologies afford could be done far cheaper, and without the risks associated with 
enhancement. Healthy skepticism is in order and warranted for the technologies I 
describe.
DBS, BCI and optogenetics are all key technologies that one day could be incor-
porated into the enhanced. Other technologies, such as modifying cellular biology 
could be used to better match our biology to our environment. While these technolo-
gies are a long way off from implementation for enhancement, they provide a guide 
to what the enhanced will be like. This section has been spent giving a plausible 
conception of how technology could be integrated to create the enhanced. There is 
room for caution and skepticism as the technology is still in its infancy. The point to 
keep in mind is that the enhanced may one day exhibit direct mental state control, 
and these beings should be kept in mind in the next section where I will test them 
against mere persons.
3  Altering moral status‑two test cases
Recall Agar’s view of moral status, MS, a being’s entitlement to beneficial treatment 
and reduced eligibility to harmful treatment. This conception of moral status will be 
tested in a hypothetical organ donation case.
3.1  Hospital
Imagine an ideal moral agent in need of an organ transplant. Unfortunately the 
patient is too ill to be moved, and there are no viable donors in the area. Two neigh-
boring hospitals have volunteers to donate and are able to excise the organ. Hospital 
A is fully modernized offering every amenity, including anesthesia and analgesics. 
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Hospital B, while modernized and safe, doesn’t believe in modern anesthetics or 
pain relievers. In all other respects, Hospital B is identical to Hospital A. Assuming 
there is some moral reason to donate an organ to this agent, although not a strong 
enough reason to force any agent to donate, should the organ be procured from Hos-
pital A or Hospital B?
Intuitively, Hospital A is the wiser choice. Much of the pain can be mitigated or 
outright eliminated, and the donor is far less likely to experience any trauma from 
either thinking about the upcoming surgery, or from actually undergoing the surgery 
while awake and alert. Hospital B can provide the same outcome as Hospital A (one 
organ to a patient in need), but it is far riskier, more painful, and offers no additional 
benefit to that of Hospital A. We can begin to imagine Hospital A represents a post-
person and hospital B represents a mere person. Mere persons have some limited 
techniques to mitigate pain and distress. During the operation they might try to regu-
late breathing or squeeze the hand of a close friend who has come for emotional sup-
port. Outside the procedure they may find external distractions like books, movies or 
music to avert their attention from the upcoming surgery. Post-Persons on the other 
hand will have more direct control. Prior to the procedure they may directly lower 
their anxiety levels or imbue themselves with a general sense of peace about the 
surgery. During surgery, post-persons may exercise some of the inhibitory control 
of optogenetics and reduce their pain or outright block it from reaching conscious 
awareness. Assuming we have some moral reason to mitigate or prevent physical 
and psychological pain in others, then we have some reason to prefer the post-person 
in the organ donation case. Since both mere persons and post-persons have a moral 
reason to donate (for the benefit of an ideal moral agent), post-persons have an addi-
tional reason that mere persons lack (reduced physical pain and psychological dis-
tress). Since we have an additional reason to prefer post-persons, they should be pre-
ferred in this case. This provides some reason to think that we should reject Agar’s 
claim that the enhanced will enjoy a greater status than ordinary humans.
What if we exclude hospital B from the scenario, and imagine a post and mere 
person in Hospital A? In this case who has greater reason to donate an organ?10 The 
prior reasoning suggests that there would be equal reason to donate between mere 
and post-persons. I think this is a mistake as mere persons are far more vulnerable, 
and so, along many more dimensions than post-persons. I will say more about vul-
nerability in what follows and greatly elaborate on it in section four.
3.2  The sinking ship
Hospital was a case of simple transplantation, but what happens in the event of an 
emergency, where it is guaranteed someone will die? McMahan worries mere per-
sons will be more violable than post-persons (McMahan 2009, p. 601). Recall, MSI 
posits the enhanced will have greater inviolability than mere persons. One such real 
life, albeit modified case is the sinking of the titanic. On McMahan’s proposal the 
10 Thanks to Moti Gorin for bringing this scenario to my attention.
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enhanced would be first on the life rafts. But for reasons similar to that of Hospital, 
I think they should go last. One reason mere persons will have priority is their sheer 
vulnerability. Their susceptibility to the fear of drowning and the pain of the cold 
frigid water, are among the reasons we think it impermissible to throw someone in 
the water. The enhanced, although incapable of surviving long periods in the cold, 
may lose out on all the pain of the ice water, and experience no fear of drowning or 
loss of life. If direct mental state control is taken into account, then we have some 
reason to think MSI will not dictate the enhanced board first, primarily, the enhanced 
will miss out on the pain and torment of drowning. Further, we may think of priority 
in terms of fair innings, where those that haven’t had the opportunity to experience 
a full life are given priority in life and death situation (Harris 1985, pp. 90–94). As 
the enhanced will have greater capacities, they will have had a better opportunity to 
experience a fuller range of life, in a shorter period of time. Even though they may 
be the same age, they have had more “innings” to play in the game of life, due to 
the fact that their cognitive capacities are greater than ours, by as much as ours are 
greater than non-human animals. These cognitive enhancements and novel forms of 
mental state control will make post-persons less vulnerable to the harms that plague 
our lives. I propose we view moral status in terms of our vulnerability:
MSV  Moral status as vulnerability. The greater a being’s susceptibility to harm 
(mental or physical), the greater the protections that are afforded, and hence, 
the greater an agent’s moral status.
 We need not completely abandon MSI as it does tell us that we are not items that 
can be readily sacrificed. The enhanced should not be harmed or in this case be 
thrown overboard on a whim, as they have a great degree of inviolability, they just 
have less of this inviolability conferring property than mere persons possess. The 
criterion to determine violability should be an agent’s vulnerability.
3.3  MSV and conflicting interests
How does MSV compare to mere interests, will it produce similar results against 
CI? As we saw Buchanan has expressed concerns about enhanced cooperators edg-
ing simple cooperators out of the dominant cooperative framework.11 Recall that CI 
states the enhanced will have a different set of interests, and a richer set of rights 
guaranteeing their interests take priority. One common interest between mere and 
post-persons will be exhibiting autonomy, contributing to society and a general feel-
ing that these contributions have a sense of purpose and meaning. Whose interest do 
we keep in mind, the simple or enhanced cooperator? As the enhanced have greater 
11 Robert Sparrow raises a stronger concern. Enhancements may proceed so quickly that those born just 
a few years later will render those just a few years older obsolete. This means one could be forced out 
their career at the age of 25 or so (Sparrow 2019). Given our psychology, it seems reasonable to worry 
that this will have negative effects. But, if post-persons are more psychologically immune, then we may 
reduce our concern for the psychological well-being of the radically enhanced.
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control over their mental states (jealousy, rage, boredom, self-worth), it seems that 
two things are likely to happen. First, the enhanced cooperators can enter mental 
states that make them amenable to cooperating at a lower level. Playing Go Fish 
has its upside when you are playing with children. If post-persons are smarter than 
mere persons to the degree that mere persons are smarter than non-human animals, 
it is fair to say that mere persons will be like children in the eyes of the enhanced. 
As adults we become frustrated with children over extended periods of time, but 
we lack the capabilities of the enhanced. The enhanced will have the capacity to 
be far more patient and will be able to sustain cooperation for much longer, as they 
can mitigate their irritation and boredom. Praise need not be a central motivation of 
the enhanced. We feel cheated when our accomplishments go unrecognized and are 
beyond indignant if our accomplishments are credited to someone else. It does not 
follow that features of our psychology will be predominant features of the enhanced. 
The enhanced may be far happier that a positive impact is made, rather than receiv-
ing credit for it, and if they aren’t, they will have the tools to foster this sentiment. 
They will recognize that mere persons need to cooperate to grow as individuals and 
put their ideas on the sideline so mere persons can contribute. Second, their supe-
rior cognitive powers may give them the ability to more clearly identify errors in 
ethical and general reasoning. Finally, the enhancements I offered are a narrow win-
dow of what the radically enhanced may be like. They may undergo specific moral 
disposition enhancements. One such method that has been proposed is to “attenu-
ate counter-moral emotions.” Such emotions might include aversion to racial groups 
and impulse toward violent aggression (Douglas 2008, p. 231). If moral disposi-
tion enhancement occurs along the way, the enhanced will not experience anything 
like the out-group hostility that is all too routine in our society. The combination 
of direct mental state control, increased rationality and specific moral enhancement 
provide compelling reasons to think the enhanced won’t believe they have superior 
rights and interests to our own.
The second point (enhanced cognitive abilities) needs more attention. In the next 
section I will argue that enhancing our cognitive abilities can serve as a moral dispo-
sition enhancer.
4  Cognitive enhancement
One way to think about cognitive enhancements is in terms of raw computing power. 
The enhanced may become better calculators or better fact accumulators. Cogni-
tive abilities understood in this way aren’t terribly interesting, as there already exists 
great variation in ability, and computers perform many basic tasks for us regularly. 
The sorts of cognitive enhancements we should aim for are ones that increase our 
ability to abstract. If the radically enhanced deserve to be called post-persons, they 
will more readily use abstraction in their reasoning, and quite possibly in a way that 
is off limits to us. If mere persons are better abstractors, then they will have better 
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insight into conflicting propositions. This will result in more coherent views, and 
increase the probability of solving contemporary moral problems.12, 13
To illustrate what I have in mind we can focus on wealth inequality, one contem-
porary problem that currently occupies the public’s mind. The ten richest men in the 
world each have wealth in excess of fifty billion dollars. The top three have more 
than twice that. Some think this is perfectly appropriate, and even morally good. But 
what if this vast wealth was not represented by ones and zeros in complex invest-
ment mechanisms, or tied up in physical assets like luxury properties and yachts, 
but rather in raw goods necessary for survival?14 What if billionaires were explicitly 
Grinchy?
4.1  The Grinchy Billionaire
Imagine a wealthy billionaire shifts his investments from long term assets to physical 
goods that are necessary to maintain a life worth living. He invests in medicines like 
insulin and vaccines, while diversifying his portfolio with stores of clean water and 
durable food products like grains and rice. The Grinchy Billionaire decides to store 
these goods in the center of towns in developing countries, just out of arms reach of 
those people who are desperately in need. This billionaire is patient and has taken 
a long-term investment strategy, waiting for the goods to become scarce, or some 
other market mechanism to take effect so he can increase profits. Naturally, people 
will try to steal these goods (as it can mean the difference between life and death), so 
armed guards will be hired to secure the compound. Does this seem moral?
My intuition is no, but I am not concerned with the conclusion as much as the 
influence of abstraction on our reasoning. The enhanced will engage in this sort of 
reasoning automatically and they will compare this case against ten, twenty or  a 
hundred cases to see which intuitions are being pumped,15 and which intuitions are 
worth preserving. This sort of reasoning can help tease apart a mere difference from 
a moral difference. My own intuition is that the method of storing wealth is a mere, 
and not a moral difference. So, if you find the Grinchy billionaire morally impermis-
sible, you should think the same of the regular billionaire.
The previous point was to establish the power of abstraction and how it may 
aide in our ethical and general reasoning. While the thought experiment purported 
to be about wealth inequality, it is really about enhancement. Buchanan notes the 
12 Persson and Savulescu (2012) argue that the cause of our problems is our thinking. For example, pol-
lution is a symptom of climate change, but our thinking is the cause. They argue the best way to solve 
moral problems is to enhance our psychology.
13 30 million adults in the US can’t read. Twice that number have basic reading skills (Baer et al. 2009). 
How much different would the world be if the average level was above proficient? At minimum, the level 
of discourse in the public sphere would be far higher.
14 At the time of this writing the coronavirus pandemic is in a stage of nascent growth. In the U.S. the 
government response may include paid sick leave, bailouts for business, cash payments to individuals 
and subsidized health care. All of this requires wealth redistribution. In a trenchant opinion piece Farhad 
Manjoo highlights how we are all socialists in a pandemic (2020).
15 See Dennett (2013).
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inequality already present between developed and developing countries “In fact, we 
already live in such a world: the world’s worst-off people are unenhanced compared 
with the best off. On average, people in ‘developed’ countries are taller, stronger, 
healthier, better able to produce and create more, better able to develop their tal-
ents, better able to promote their own values, and longer-lived than people in ‘less-
developed’ countries” (Buchanan 2009, p. 357). Buchanan is talking about the 
importance of a concept like human rights, and that even though those in developed 
countries are better off, the concept of human rights tells us we have obligations to 
provide basic living conditions to those that are less well off. The claim in no way 
makes reference to notions of superiority or inferiority. If we accept that better diets, 
access to health care, and education constitute enhancements, then wealthy elites, 
like the Grinchy Billionaire, can be thought of as post-persons,16 and the impov-
erished can be thought of as mere persons. For those that are concerned with the 
enhanced edging people out of society, promoting their own interests, they should 
be equally concerned with the wealthy, who do that now.
A large portion of the opposition to enhancement come from religious conserva-
tives.17 A full 61% of adults in the US think there is too much wealth inequality, 
but only 41% of conservatives think so. Further, 60% of conservatives think wealth 
inequality is driven by life choices (Horrowitz et al. 2020). If I am right that wealth 
inequality and enhancement are far more alike than not, and conservatives oppose 
enhancement, but are ok with wealth inequality, then there is a mistake in reasoning 
happening somewhere. One candidate is in how the scenarios are framed (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008, p. 36). The ability to abstract is one tool to overcome perni-
cious framing effects. More worrying is that only 6% of conservatives (and 13% of 
democrats) think that philosophy and reason are a source of guidance on right and 
wrong, while 87% of conservatives think religion and common sense are sufficient 
guides to morality (Religion in America 2015). This is even reflected in philosophy 
at the highest level. Kass, a bioconservative who has served on the president’s coun-
cil of bioethics, has famously argued for the wisdom of disgust (Kass 1997). The 
enhanced will have reason to be skeptical of their primal intuitions and appreciate 
the role careful thinking plays in creating a moral society. The benefits conferred by 
increasing our cognitive capacities are unknown, but it is difficult to imagine that 
better thinkers will make the errors we routinely make.
It might be objected that since I think wealth inequality is impermissible, and 
since the enhanced are analogous to the Grinchy Billionaire, I should treat the cases 
equally and argue against enhancement. The analogy falls apart as the Grinchy Bil-
lionaire is all too human. I would be against enhancement if the goal was to create 
better athletes, entertainers and those that can create algorithms to better track the 
stock market, but these are only a small fraction of the goals of enhancement. If 
we enhance the things that make humans so wonderful, if we enhance the ability 
16 The analogy could just as easily be made within affluent states. The prospects and outcome for some-
one with a PhD in evolutionary biology are much different than that of the local Sasquatch hunter.
17 Kass (2017) offers a conservative catholic viewpoint. Francis Fukuyama (2002) offers a more secular-
ized conservative viewpoint.
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for careful reflection, or the ability to exercise compassion, then post-persons won’t 
embody the Grinchy Billionaire.
5  Moral status and vulnerability
Our vulnerabilities may be exploited in the form of oppression (Frye 1983), as a way 
to exclude from political and social life (Mill 1869), or as way to justify differential 
treatment and instill obedience in women (Wollstonecraft 1792). Vulnerability may 
vary by group. Not because one group is intrinsically more vulnerable than the next, 
but because group membership can serve as a way to identify, impose and uphold 
pernicious societal norms. These norms have forced women to fight for the right 
to govern their own bodies (Thomson 1971). Same sex couples have to battle for 
equal treatment, and in the case of gay men, are often thought of as disgusting or 
viewed as contaminants (Nussbaum 2004, p. 113). The disabled have to argue that 
their differences are mere differences, as opposed to bad differences (Barnes 2014), 
and those that suggest that racism, the most visible form of discrimination is still a 
problem, are met with public backlash (Yancy 2018). As important as these issues 
are, they fall outside of the scope of this paper. The radically enhanced will be suf-
ficiently different than us, warranting their vulnerability to be thought of as different 
in kind. Martha Nussbaum captures the idea of vulnerability well.
But the idea of vulnerability is closely connected to the idea of emotion. Emo-
tions are responses to these areas of vulnerability, responses in which we reg-
ister the damages we have suffered, might suffer, or luckily have failed to suf-
fer. To see this, let us imagine beings who are really invulnerable to suffering, 
totally self-sufficient… Such beings would have no reason to fear, because 
nothing that could happen to them would be really bad. They would have no 
reasons for anger, because none of the damages other people could do to them 
would be a truly significant damage, touching on matters of profound impor-
tance. They would have no reasons for grief, because, being self-sufficient, 
they would not love anything outside themselves, at least not with the needy 
human type of love that gives rise to profound loss and depression. Envy and 
jealousy would similarly be absent from their lives (Nussbaum 2004, p. 6).
Post-persons will not be gods, but they will be much closer than mere persons 
are. If we lack moral concern for gods, and the reason is their lack of vulnerabil-
ity, then we have some reason to include vulnerability as a criterion for moral sta-
tus. Post-persons on my account, will be far less vulnerable, and hence, warrant less 
moral concern. Vulnerability is a scalar property, one that should be viewed in terms 
of weak thresholds, of which, adding to, and taking from, make a great difference to 
moral status.
As alluded to earlier, the difference in vulnerability of mere persons is incidental 
rather than intrinsic. We are all in the same boat, but in different seas. For example, 
a refugee will be highly vulnerable, as she might be in a new country, unfamiliar 
with the language and customs, and looked at as an out-group member. But this is 
an accident of nature. If the Grinchy Billionaire loses his fortune, and becomes a 
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refugee, he will be just as vulnerable as the typical refugee. He is still in the same 
boat, but in a different sea. Our circumstances change the degree of our vulnerabil-
ity, but not our vulnerability in kind. The enhanced are much different. They will be 
in the same sea as us, but in a different boat. The experience of an enhanced refugee 
will be unlike that of the millions of refugees in desperate need of aid.
To capture our intrinsic invulnerability, absent the baggage of unjust societal 
norms, I want to focus on our sensitivity to insult and our ability and composure 
to rebuff them. Southern white men grow up in cultures of honor where they are 
expected to defend themselves reflexively against insult. Social status is called into 
questions for those men who aren’t “men” and don’t exhibit lax talionis—the law 
of retribution. This behavior is found on and off the farm, as one study found dif-
ferences in responses to insult among Southern and Northern college students. In 
this study, participants were bumped into and then insulted (called an asshole) by 
a researcher. Southern students’ levels of cortisol and testosterone increased more 
so than their Northern counterparts after the bump and insult. Southerners felt that 
others perceived them as having less social status, and when given an opportunity to 
demonstrate their toughness by being administered electrical shocks, they opted for 
higher levels than their Northern counterparts. They were even more likely to exhibit 
aggressive behavior towards others after the bump and insult (Cohen et al. 1996). 
White republican men, with a high school education who live in rural areas are most 
likely to be gun owners and cite protection as the number one reason for ownership18 
(The Demographics of Gun Ownership 2017). Data from twin studies suggest there 
is a genetic component to political beliefs (Funk et al. 2013), and FMRI has been 
used to predict political party affiliation by mere exposure to non-political images 
(Ahn et al. 2014). While honor culture certainly has a cultural component, it may 
have a genetic component as well. Are these white men more vulnerable than their 
northern counterparts? If so, do they deserve more moral status?
The answer to the first question is both yes and no. They have emotional response 
to insults, that others may readily brush off. They may even be disposed to view 
mild insults as damaging and elicit an emotional response. Defending your territory 
and manhood all day is both taxing and dangerous. But this isn’t drastically differ-
ent than our general vulnerability in different contexts. For example, if a northern 
undergraduate is told her idea is risible in front of the class, she may have a similar 
physiological and emotional response to those in honor cultures. In the U.S., FERPA 
laws are in place to ensure education records are kept private, sparing students from 
the pain and embarrassment of sharing a poor performance. For college students, 
good grades may serve as a mark of social status, and those that struggle may per-
ceive that others think they have a lower social status. So the vulnerability is differ-
ent in degree and type, but not in kind. The cultural and genetic lottery will shape 
18 Women are the least likely to own weapons. This is odd in that women are far more likely to be vic-
tims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Given that women are in some instances more vulnerable 
to physical abuses, you would expect them to own the most guns if gun ownership is really about protec-
tion. While gun ownership among white men may be related to protection, I speculate that honor culture 
and protecting “manhood” play a pivotal role.
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what bothers us, and how it does, but we are all still in the same boat, only the con-
text of the seas change. In order for moral status to change, vulnerability along many 
dimensions must change.
The enhanced will be far less vulnerable along several dimensions, enough to 
lower their moral status. Insults will not readily bother them (as they don’t both 
many mere persons), and when they do, they will have the capacity to reduce the 
severity of the blow. They won’t be ashamed of poor performance in athletics or 
academics, because it will be obvious that those that excel in certain areas will have 
different enhancements. It will be readily apparent that their talents are not entirely 
their own. It will become far more obvious the degree to which our genetic and tech-
nological enhancements supplement character and drive our performances. Post-per-
sons will be less manipulatable. Mere persons love rewards, even for the most trivial 
of accomplishments, such as the badges and awards ubiquitous in mobile applica-
tions. Post-Persons will have control over their dopamine driven reward pathway, 
allowing them to recoup their time, and focus on things that really matter.
Finally, decreasing vulnerability will make post-persons more moral. Direct men-
tal state control will allow them to exhibit the virtue of courage or allow them to 
curb the desire to deceive. Following moral rules will become the rule, and not the 
exception. They will abandon lax-talionis, and focus on ways to improve the qual-
ity of life for people in great need, as opposed to creating more pain.19 They will be 
more generous, as they will have the capacity to feel the same excitement towards a 
traditional lottery ticket, as one whose grand prize is millions of dollars to charity. 
For the radically enhanced both a single and a million deaths will be a tragedy.
6  Objections
Many will still be worried that the enhanced will not be nearly as altruistic as 
I have argued for. I will concede that nothing necessitates the enhanced to be 
benevolent beings. But necessity is too high of a bar to set. We set the bar far 
lower for the sorts of interventions we already employ. Imagine if we thought 
it necessary for educational interventions to guarantee smarter and more moral 
citizens before we implemented them. Instead we hope that these sorts of inter-
ventions make an on average contribution to the quality of children’s lives. On 
average, we hope they are better able to cope with the demands of contemporary 
society. The same should be thought of for the radically enhanced. They will be 
in a far better position to realize errors in reasoning and have the tools to bet-
ter curb unwanted desires and impulses. But this will be no utopia. As with all 
19 Katrien Devolder has argued that prisoners have the right to die. She focuses on the case of Frank Van 
Den Bleeken, a serial rapist and murder. He admits he has done terrible things and feels he is beyond 
recovery, and yet, is destined to a life of imprisonment (2016). For a brief period of time the court ruled 
he could be euthanized. One victim’s sister remarked “For us this is incomprehensible. He should rot in 
his cell” (Bletchly and Allen 2014). The court later overturned their ruling, ensuring Bleeken will live. 
There is a real question as to what sorts of punishments are appropriate, and for how long they should be 
meted out. If it was up to family members of victims, I fear that the punishment would be indefinite.
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populations there will be variation, and there will still be those we need protec-
tion from. It will take an enormous effort to figure out the science of improv-
ing humanity, but it strains credulity to think this is unachievable or unlikely 
through enhancement. If you are worried that the enhanced will be worse in 
some ways than us, consider de-enhancements, the interventions that make us 
less intelligent and less physically and cognitively capable. Would we be better 
off? Hesitation in response may be due to a status quo bias (Bostrom and Ord 
2006), or an imagined hope that we are the pinnacle of perfection. However, 
I find it hard to imagine that if we stumbled across human-like beings whose 
capacities were greater than ours by a mere 5%, that we should encourage them 
to reduce their capacities to match our own.
What does MSV mean for non-human animals? Surely, they are more vulner-
able than us. Do they deserve more moral status? Maybe, but this is an empiri-
cal question we are unable to answer at the moment. We have reasons to think 
non-human animals experience pain like we do. They have similar anatomy and 
physiology, and their behavior indicates they are capable of pain. But their inner 
life is probably drastically different. I hesitate to speculate what it is like, but I 
am comfortable saying that like the enhanced, animals are in a different boat, 
but this time in the opposite direction. Their inner lives are most likely not any-
where near as rich as ours, and they probably are incapable of feeling some of 
the deepest senses of sadness and loss that we are. Again, this is an empirical 
question, and if it turned out they had rich inner lives and are far more suscep-
tible to emotional pains, would it be so bad if we elevated their moral status? It 
would certainly be weird and uncomfortable to view a dairy cow the same as a 
human, but that would seem far more preferable than treating them the way we 
currently do. I think we have little to worry on this front, but time will tell.
Finally, emotional and physical pain is often thought to be a good thing. It 
helps us grow into mature individuals and prevents us from injuring ourselves 
to the point of no return. But it is not necessary as evidenced by Jo Cameron, a 
71-year-old woman who experiences little anxiety and described childbirth as a 
tickle (Murphy 2019). I am not suggesting a complete removal of pain, but with 
the help of technology such as optogenetics we may alter our relationship to it, 
freeing us from the bondage it keeps us in. There is no reason giving birth needs 
to be extremely painful, just like there is no reason to fear public speaking. How 
much pain we do and don’t need is an empirical question. If we start enhancing, 
we can answer this along the way. My optimism may need some bridling, but the 
alternative is to trust natural selection got it right. I find this as implausible as 
the hypothesis we were created by an all knowing, all kind, all powerful deity.
Finally, this is a speculative account and should be treated as such. My aim is 
not to describe how the enhanced will actually be, rather, it is to give a plausible 
conception of the enhanced and establish that they could have a lower moral 
status than their ordinary human counterparts, despite increased capacities and 
abilities. On this front, I think I succeeded.
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7  Conclusion
I have argued that it is likely humans will seek out enhancements that allow for 
greater mental state control. It is readily assumed that enhancement will have the 
effect of raising moral status, or at minimum, confer some additional rights the 
unenhanced will lack. As greater mental state control can reduce one’s vulnerabil-
ity, and vulnerability is a criterion for moral status, the enhanced will experience a 
moral status reduction when compared to their ordinary human counterparts. If I am 
right about the enhanced it is not their attitudes towards us we should be most afraid 
of, it is our attitudes toward them.
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